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The Role of the World Court in Settling
International Disputes: A Recent
Assessment
SUSAN W.

I.

TIEFENBRUN*

INTRODUCrION

This Article examines the role of the International Court of
Justice (World Court)1 as the principal judicial body of the United

Nations. 2 In an attempt to evaluate the World Court's effectiveness
as a forum for settling international disputes, this Article examines
the current role of the court in light of its past record. Given the
significant changes in the global political climate, the development
of other international tribunals, the heightened use of international
arbitration to settle disputes, and the increased activity of the World
Court in its advisory capacity, an understanding of the future role of

the World Court in settling international disputes is vital for those
engaged in international law or politics.

* Dr. Susan Tiefenbrun is Director of International Law Programs and Adjunct
Professor at Hofstra University School of Law. This paper was presented at a conference
entitled, United Nations at Fifty, sponsored by Hofstra University on March 16, 1995. I
wish to give special thanks to Jeremy Wolk of Hofstra University School of Law for his
research assistance in updating this study.
1. This Article uses the terms World Court, ICJ, or the Court to refer to the International Court of Justice.
2. U.N. CHARTER arts. 7,92.
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Many have criticized the World Court's effectiveness in the
past.3 Its record dramatically improved, however, in 1991 after the
fall of Communism in the former Soviet Union and in much of Eastern Europe. Earlier, during the Nicaraguan dispute in 1985, the
United States adopted a highly negative view towards the World
Court, echoing the critical sentiments of numerous nations. The
United States believed that the World Court was politically motivated rather than impartial. 4 In addition, critics at that time called
the World Court a weak, irrelevant, and even "moribund" forum. 5
Reservations about the World Court by the major world powers
stemmed partly from widespread questioning of contemporary international law. 6 Before the fall of Communism, many viewed international law as the product of European imperialism and the
World Court as an institution that failed to take sufficient account of
the changed patterns of international relations.7
In 1985, the United States not only voiced its general dissatisfaction with the World Court,8 it twice vetoed Nicaraguan attempts
to enforce the World Court's decision in the U.N. Security Council.
The United States withdrew its declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court, and it entirely withdrew from
3. See generally J. Patrick Kelly, The Changing Process of InternationalLaw and the
Role of the World Court, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 129 (1989) (discussing legal scholars' views on
the role of the World Court, including the views of Thomas Franck, Louis Sohn, Michael
Reisman, Eugene Rostow, and Richard Falk).
4. See generally MICHLA POMERANCE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD
COURT AS A 'SUPREME COURT OF THE NATIONS': DREAMS, ILLUSIONS AND DISILLUSION

(1996) (presenting a comprehensive review of U.S. attitudes toward the concept of a World
Court, and U.S. disillusionment with the prospect and performance of the International
Court of Justice and other international adjudicative bodies).
5. See generally John C. Guilds, III, "If It Quacks Like a Duck": Comparingthe IC[
Chambers to InternationalArbitrationfor a Mechanism of Enforcement, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 43 (1992).
6. See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 17 (1985) (citing OLIVER JAMES LISSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
TODAY AND TOMORROW (1965)).
7. RICHARD FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT x (1986).
It also made me aware of the reality of the International Court of Justice as an institution: its absurd formality and archaic quality; the deep sense of pride and
commitment shared by its judges, who agree on little else; and most of all, the remoteness of this judicial atmosphere from the changing currents of international
life.
Id.
8. See United States: Department of State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of I.CJ. Compulsory Jurisdiction, reprintedin 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985) This
letter stated that as of October 7, 1985, the United States opted to end its 40 year acceptance
of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. See id
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the Nicaraguan proceedings. 9 The United States boycotted the
merits phase and did not participate in the subsequent compensation
phase. The Sandinista regime claimed billions of dollars as damages, and the Chamorro administration withdrew this claim as part
of the overall settlement.10 When the World Court entered its
judgment against the United States, 1 criticism of the World Court
escalated. Critics questioned the Court's role as a fair tribunal for
the adjudication of international disputes.
In contrast, the World Court in the 1990s is increasingly respected as an international adjudicator, and it is busier than ever before. 12 The World Court no longer represents an "irrelevant" judicial institution. It has emerged as a viable international institution
due, in part, to the steady performance of past duties. 13
Currently, the World Court examines a wide variety of international legal issues. 14 The World Court issues judgments, provides
advice, and mediates settlement negotiations of cases being decided
in the Court. 15 Since 1946, the Court has delivered sixty dispute
9. See, e.g., U.S. Decision to Withdraw from the Int'l Court of Justice: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int'l Orgs. of the Comm on ForeignAffairs, 99th Cong.
1 (1985) (statement of Gus Yatron, Chairman, Subcomm. on Human Rights and Int'l Org. of
the Comm. on Foreign Affairs); U.S. Terminates Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1986, 67; U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by
Nicaragua in the ICJ, DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 1985, at 64; Abraham D. Sofaer, Adjudication
in the InternationalCourt of Justice: Progress Through Realism, 44 REC. OF THE ASS'N OF
THE BAR OF THE CrrY OF N.Y. 459,462 (1989).
10. See Keith Highet, The Peace PalaceHeats Up: The World Court in Business Again?,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 646, 647 (1991) [hereinafter Peace Palace].
11. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27).
12. See Peace Palace,supranote 10, at 646.
13. See id
14. For example, in 1992 a number of States came to the World Court by special agreement to settle disputes. These disputes included a territorial dispute between El Salvador
and Honduras, a border dispute between Libya and Chad, and the Danube Diversion case
between the Slovak Republic and Hungary. See infra Part III.B.1. States have brought other
major disputes to the World Court including the Aerial Incidentcase, the Oil Platforms case
between Iran and the United States, and the East Timor case between Portugal and Australia. Similarly, activity increased in both 1993 and 1994. See infra Part III.B.3. In 1995, the
Court handled the FisheriesJurisdictioncase between Spain and Canada. In the same year, a
total of 13 cases appeared on the general list of cases. In 1996, a new case was brought before the Court involving a boundary dispute between Botswana and Namibia over the
Kasikili/Sedudu Island and the legal status of the island. See infra Part II.B.4. See also Report of the InternationalCourt of Justice, August 1, 1995-July 31, 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st
Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 37, U.N. Doc. A/51/4 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Report].
15. See Keith Highet, The InternationalCourt of Justice in the Post-Cold War World, 2
AM. SOC'y INT'L BULL. EDUC. RESOURCES ON INT'L LAW 5 (1994) [hereinafter IC/].
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judgments concerning, inter alia, land frontiers and maritime
boundaries, territorial sovereignty the non-use of force, and the noninterference in the internal affairs of States. In addition, other cases
dealt with diplomatic relations, hostages, the right of asylum, nationality, guardianship, rights of passage, and economic rights."6
Part II of the Article discusses the history as well as the jurisdictional reach of the Court. Part III focuses on the Court's judicial
record, beginning with the Court's lean years from 1922 to 1984, and
then extensively examines the Court's increased activity since 1991.
Part IV explains the general purpose of the World Court, discusses
the Court's strengths and weaknesses and explains why States
should select the World Court as a dispute resolution forum. Part V
examines the Court's future in settling international disputes, given
the changes in political climate, the development of other international tribunals, the increased use of international arbitration as a
means of dispute settlement, and the Court's increased activity in its
advisory capacity. Finally, Part VI concludes that nothwithstanding
the impacet of the Court's weaknesses, the Court is busier than ever
in maintaining world peace.
II.

HISTORY OF THE WORLD COURT

A. Formationof the World Court
The United Nations Charter established the World Court as an
organ of the United Nations. 17 The Statute of the Court, a special
part of the United Nations Charter, governs the Court. 18 The Charter of the United Nations provides that "[a]ll Members of the
United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice." 19 The International Court of Justice embraces two courts, the Permanent Court of International Justice, set
16. See The International Court of Justice: An Overview of Organs (visited Mar. 5,
1997) <http://www.un.orgloverview/organs/icj.html>.
17. The International Court of Justice is the "principal judicial organ" of the United
Nations. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
18. See NAGENDRA SINGH, THE ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE 43 (1989).
19. U.N. CHARTER, STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 93, para. 1. Furthermore, it provides

that "[a] State which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the
General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council." Id art. 93 para. 2. A
State's membership in the United Nations, however, does not mean it must automatically
accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. See idart. 93, paras. 1-2.
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up in 1919 as a tribunal for peace settlement, and the International
Court of Justice, founded in 1945 as the principal judicial body of
20
the United Nations.
The World Court is located in the Hague in a building called
the Peace Palace. 21 The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council elect fifteen judges from different countries 22 for
staggered terms of nine years. 23 Judges must be impartial and must
decide cases according to the rules of international law. 24
In addition, judges must elect a President and a Vice-President
of the Court. On February 6, 1987 the judges elected Stephen
Schwebel of the United States as President, and Christopher
Weeramantry of Sri Lanka as Vice-President of the Court.25 Both of
their terms of office will expire on February 6, 2000.26
The current composition of the judges on the Court in order of
seniority is: Shigeru Oda, Japan; Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algeria;
Gilbert Guillaume, France; Raymond Ranjeva, Madagascar; Geza
Herczegh, Hungary; Shi Jiuyong, China; Carl-August Fleischauer,
Germany; Abdul G. Koroma, Sierra Leone; Vladlen S. Vereschchetin, Russian Federation; Rosalyn Higgins, United Kingdom;
Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren, Venezuela; Peter H. Kooijmans, Netherlands; and Jose F. Rezek, Brazil. 27
The World Court has two purposes: to settle legal disputes
among States in accordance with international law and to give U.N.
agencies advisory opinions on legal questions.28 The Statute of the
Court defines the tribunal's powers to decide disputes. In contentious cases, only sovereign States may apply to appear before the
Court.2 9 Currently, the 185 member States of the United Nations
and the non-member States that have become parties to the Court's

20.
21.
22.
23.
at 109.
24.
25.

See J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 109 (2d ed. 1991).
See SINGH, supra note 18, at 41.
See Merrill, supra note 20, at 123.
See U.N.CHARTER, STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 13; MERRILLS, supra note 20,

See U.N.CHARTER, STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 13.
See Peter H.F. Bekker, Recent Developments at the World Court AM. SoC'Y INT'L

L. NEWSL., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 1, 8 [hereinafter Recent Developments Mar.-Apr. 1997].
26. See id
27. See id
28. See U.N.CHARTER, STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 65, para. 1; SINGH, supra note 18,
at 14.

29. See id
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Statute may apply to appear before the Court.30
The World Court can hear and decide disputes only when the
States involved consent to its jurisdiction.31 Thus, the World Court
does not have automatic compulsory jurisdiction. 32 States may consent in one of three ways: (1) by the signing of a Special Agreement
to submit the dispute to the Court; (2) by virtue of a jurisdictional
clause in a treaty to which both States are parties; or (3) through the
reciprocal effect of declarations made by the parties under the Statute. Where reciprocal declarations are made, each State accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory in the event of a dispute with
33
another State having made a similar declaration.
Some legal scholars believe that compulsory jurisdiction must
be implemented for the World Court to be an effective peace
keeper. 34 Compulsory jurisdiction would enable the Court to better
resolve international disputes, 35 without having to seek jurisdiction
over the States in each submitted case.
There are three categories of jurisdiction: rationemateriae,ratione personae, and ratione temporis. Each of these categories imposes limitations on the Court's jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction rationemateriae grants the Court broad reach. This
jurisdiction covers all cases that parties refer to the Court and all
matters specially provided for in the U.N. Charter, or in treaties and

30. The two non-member States are Nauru and Switzerland. See 1995 Report, supra
note 14, at 5.
31. See U.N. CHARTER, STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 36, para. 1. "The jurisdiction of
the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to in all matters specially provided for
in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force." Id Therefore,
the Court must first determine that all States involved have agreed to submit to the Court's
exercise of jurisdiction.
32. See id art. 36, para. 2.
33. This is said to have been brought by one party's "application."
34. Cf THOMAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986).

The United

States should increase its utilization of the International Court of Justice, and reaccept the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction subject to several important qualifications. In addition, the
United States should reserve for the World Court disputes involving hostilities, armed conflict, and individual and collective self-defense. Moreover, the United States should also be
able to choose the panel of judges through special chamber procedures. See id. at 65-73.
Furthermore, the United States should also be able to request the Court to render a decision
limited to a declaration of applicable legal principles rather than rendering a final order and
eliminating the Connally reservation, which excludes matters of domestic jurisdiction from
the World Court. See id at 75-76.
35. See SINGH, supra note 18, at 29. Jurisdiction is the "key element" in international
judicial settlement and in the assessment of the Court's performance. All hope of universal
compulsory jurisdiction, however, was abandoned early in 1947. See id at 12.
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conventions currently in force. 36 The World Court under ratione
materiae jurisdiction will only consider questions of law, not political
or economic interest questions. Similarly, the Court will accept
advisory jurisdiction cases only if they involve a "legal question. '37
The personality of the parties defines jurisdiction rationepersonae. In the World Court only States may be parties in cases before
the Court. 38 Thus, States that are parties to the present Statute including all U.N. members as well as other States such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein and San Marino, may seek judicial settlement of
international disputes before the World Court.39 The principles of
jurisdiction ratione materiae and rationepersonae are rough equivalents of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction in domestic law.
The third category, jurisdiction ratione temporis exists, but not
as an independent jurisdictional requirement either in the Statute of
the Court or in the opinions of the Permanent Court or World
Court.40 A state's reservations to this type of jurisdiction may restrict the period in which the Court can assert otherwise valid jurisdiction against the declarant. 41 There are no jurisdictional statutes
of limitations unless the State itself opts to impose a limit. 42
Once the Court asserts proper jurisdiction, the proceedings before the Court include a written phase and subsequent oral phase.
During the written phase, the parties file and exchange pleadings
called Memorial and Counter-Memorial. In the second round, these
pleadings are called Reply and Rejoinder. The subsequent oral
phase consists of public hearings at which agents and counsel ad43
dress the Court.

36. See idat 13.
37. See id
38. See U.N. CHARTER, STATUTE OF THE COURT art. 34, para. 1
39. See idart. 35.
40. See SINGH, supra note 18, at 12-13 (describing the three categories of jurisdiction).
41. See id. at 13 (stating that "a State is free to limit its acceptance of jurisdiction by
reference to specific dates or periods").
42. See SINGH, supra note 18, at 13. For example, Israel excluded historical events from
judicial scrutiny between May 5, 1948 and July 20, 1949. See id.
43. See id. at 237.
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B. Jurisdictionof the World Court
1. Contentious Jurisdiction and the Nature of Consent
The World Court has three kinds of jurisdiction: contentious,
incidental, and advisory jurisdiction. Contentious jurisdiction is
based on the consent of the parties to the dispute.44 A State can
consent to jurisdiction in a number of ways, either before or after the
dispute arises.45 For example, consent to jurisdiction before the dispute arises may be made by means of a compromissory clause in a
treaty, a declaration under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court
or a special agreement. Alternatively, consent can be given after a
dispute has arisen by a special agreement between the parties, by
one party in response to the unilateral reference of a dispute to the
46
World Court, or by performance of a legal act indicating consent.
A legal act indicating consent of jurisdiction establishes consent,
even if the State is unwilling to litigate later when an actual case
arises. 47 Thus, conflicts between the consensual basis and objections
to the Court's jurisdiction from unwilling respondents do not arise.
Two types of treaties provide for the referral of the disputes to
the World Court in advance of the dispute: multilateral instruments
having a general aim and multilateral instruments having a more
specific aim.48 Multilateral treaties having a general aim of promoting peace, like the General Act of 1928, the 1948 Pact of Bogota,
and the 1957 European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes, represent general agreements to jurisdiction. These treaties bind signatories to jurisdiction. This type of multilateral instrument has generally failed, however, to provide jurisdiction by consent either because most States do not support them or because
States that sign such treaties accept the Court's jurisdiction with substantial reservations. 49
Multilateral treaties having a more specific aim may contain an
article which provides that disputes regarding the interpretation or
application of that agreement can be referred to the World Court.
Treaties of this type are less common but have provided the basis of
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See MERRILLS, supra note 20, at 110.
See id at 109-10.
See id at 110 (describing the number of ways a State may give consent).
See id
See id (discussing the two types of multilateral instruments).
See id
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jurisdiction in several cases. 50
In addition, before the dispute arises, Article 36(2) of the Statute of the Court provides the states with an optional clause. If a
State makes a declaration under the optional clause, it accepts the
judicial settlement of a dispute on certain terms and conditions. 51 If
both signatory States agree to an optional clause declaration, then
jurisdiction is established. However, less than one-third of the U.N.
members, however, have made declarations under Article 36(2), and
many of those declarations are weakened by reservations. 52 The
number of declarations accepting the Court's jurisdiction under the
optional clause is on a slow but steady upward trend.53
Provisions for reservations are stated in Article 36, paragraph 3
of the Statute, allowing States to include conditions regarding reciprocity and limiting the duration of a declaration under the optional
clause. 54 Although the Statute conspicuously fails to refer to the
possibility of making reservations that exclude certain types of disputes, matters, or parties from an acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, it is "generally recognized that States have an inherent right
50. For example, in 1980 the Court decided the dispute over the detention of the U.S.
diplomatic and consular staff in Teheran. The Court had jurisdiction because both the
United States and Iran were parties to the Protocols Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes attached to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations of
1961 and 1963. See id
51. See id.
52. See id at 111 (citing J.G. Merrills, The Optional Clause Today, 50 B.Y.B.I.L. 8
(1979)).
53. In 1993, 58 of 185 member States made such acceptances. See Report of the International Court of Justice, August 1, 1992-July 31, 1993, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No.
4, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/48/4 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 Report]. Since August 1, 1992, two
treaties providing for the jurisdiction of the Court in contentious proceedings and registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations have been brought to the knowledge of
the Court: the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation concluded at Rome on March 10, 1988 (art. 16, para. 1); and the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, done at Paris on January 13, 1993 (art. 14).
In 1996, 59 out of 185 member States made such declarations with reservations. See 1995
Report, supra note 14, at 5. Since 1992, there have been several additions to the list of
treaties with jurisdiction clauses. See 1992 Report,supra at 3.
54. See Douglas J. Ende, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdictionof the International
Court of Justice: A Proposalfor a New United States Declaration,61 WASH L. REV. 1145,
1152-53 (1986).
The Court has interpreted Article 36 to require that when the Court is seized of
a dispute on the basis of compulsory jurisdiction, the reservations of each declaration will be binding on both parties, in the sense that each party is entitled to
invoke any relevant reservation appearing in either party's declaration.
Id. at 1153.
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under the optional clause through nonto qualify their declarations
'55
reservations.
statutory
The Statute recognizes four broad categories of reservations:
(1) reservations regarding termination and modification, such as
conditions; (2) reservations ratione temporis, temporal reservations;
and
(3) reservations rationepersonae, reservations as to the parties;
56
(4) reservations ratione materiae,subject-matter reservations.
The United States' automatic reservation seems to include all
four types of reservations. Its reservation, commonly referred to as
the Connally Amendment, excludes "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States of America as determined by the United States of
America .... -157 The Connally Reservation effectively grants the
United States the power to avoid jurisdiction in all World Court
use
matters. 58 Through the principle of reciprocity, other States can
59
this reservation to escape actions brought by the United States.
For consent to jurisdiction after the dispute arises, parties may
60
negotiate a special agreement, similar to an arbitral compromis.
Jurisdiction over a dispute may be based on consent shown by a
legal act. However, sometimes disagreements develop as to whether
the States involved have given the Court the necessary consent. The
Court must resolve this dispute pursuant to Article 36(6) of the
Statute, which confers competence de la competence.
Initially, proceedings in the World Court often involve jurisdictional disputes, and these may form a separate stage of the proceedings. For example, in the Nicaragua case,61 brought by Nicaragua
against the United States in 1984, the World Court accepted the respondent's argument that a reservation covering certain multilateral
treaties applied. The Court held, however, that it still had jurisdic-

55. See i&at 1152.
56. See id. at 1156 (discussing the reservations in State practice).
57. United States Declaration of Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218.
58. See SINGH, supra note 18, at 21.
59. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 140 (discussing Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v.
Bulg.), 1960 I.C.J. 146 (May 30) where Bulgaria invoked the Connally Amendment reciprocally much to the embarrassment of the United States).
60. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS
65, 68 (3rd ed. 1973) [hereinafter WORLD COURT]; see also Continental Shelf (Tunis. v.
Libya), 1982 I.CJ. 18 (Feb. 24).
61. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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tion to decide the case on the basis of customary international law. 62
2. Incidental Jurisdiction
The second type of jurisdiction the World Court has is incidental jurisdiction. Incidental jurisdiction grants the World Court the
power to order interim measures of protection, the power to allow a
State to intervene, 63 and the power to revise or interpret a judgment.64 The Statute of the Court confers these powers and does not
require the States to give further consent. 65
3. Advisory Jurisdiction
The third type of jurisdiction granted to the World Court is advisory jurisdiction, which addresses rights and duties of international
organizations. 66 Advisory jurisdiction enables the Court to give international organizations legal opinions at their request. 67 For example, the General Assembly may ask the Court to issue an advisory opinion regarding legal disputes between States. 68
Since 1946, the Court has issued twenty-three Advisory Opinions concerning, inter alia, admission to United Nations membership, reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United
Nations, territorial status of South-West Africa (Namibia) and
Western Sahara, judgments rendered by international administrative tribunals, expenses of certain United Nations operations, and
the applicability of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement. 69

62. See id
63. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF

JUSTICE 28, 29 (1993) (setting forth the power of intervention in Articles 62 and 63)
[hereinafter INTERVENTION].
64. See MERRILLS, supra note 20, at 116. Article 71 grants the World Court the power
to revise a judgment; however, this power can only be exercised if new facts are discovered
that would have had a decisive effect on the decision. The Court's ability to interpret a
judgment represents a broader power and, according to Article 60, can be performed at the
request of any party. See id. at 122.
65. See MERRILLS, supranote 20, at 116.

66. See id. at 122.
67. See id
68. See id
69. See The InternationalCourt of Justice: An Overview of Organs (visited Mar. 3, 1997)
<httpJ/www.un.org/overview/organs/icj.html>.
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RECORD OF THE WORLD COURT

A. The Lean Years. 1922-1940; 1946-1987
The record supports the contention that the World Court has
not lived up to the international community's expectations of having
a single judicial forum which would resolve international disputes
and promulgate binding international law.70 From 1922 until 1940,
the Permanent Court of International Justice heard twenty-nine
cases and issued twenty-seven advisory opinions. 71 From 1946 to
1987, the International Court of Justice or a Chamber of the Court
conferred judgments on the merits of twenty-three cases, 72 terminated twelve cases in the preliminary stages, discontinued five cases,
and issued nineteen advisory opinions. Thus, in sixty-five years, the
two institutions decided sixty-four contentious cases and forty-six
advisory opinions.
In the years 1952, 1963-66, and 1968-69, the International Court
did not receive any new cases, nor did it receive requests for adviheard
sory opinions.73 This record indicates that the two tribunals
74
an average of two cases per year-hardly a brilliant record.
Several explanations exist for the World Court's lean years.
They include the World Court's location in the Hague, a persistent
dispute between justiciable and non-justiciable cases, 75 two world
wars, and governments' common fear of losing control over the
resolution of disputes. 76 In addition, its lean years were due to a
general lack of confidence in the Court, in its composition, and in international law which the Court applies. 77

70. See Leo Gross, The International Court of Justice: Considerationof Requirements
for Enhancingits Role in the InternationalLegal Order,65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 253 (1971)
[hereinafter Consideration].
71. See SINGH, supra note 18, at 219 (discussing the Court's achievements and a statistical appraisal of both the World Court and the Permanent Court of International Justice).
at 219.
72. See id.
73. See Leo Gross, Underutilizationof the InternationalCourtof Justice, 27 HARV. INT'L
LJ. 571,573 (1986) [hereinafter Underutilization].
74. See SINGH, supra note 18, at 219.
75. See Underutilization,supra note 73, at 571.
76. See id at 572.
77. See Consideration,supra note 70, at 253.
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B. IncreasedActivity of the Court: 1991-1997

1. 1991
Recent changes in the global political climate have dramatically
increased the number of cases adjudicated by the World Court. The
1991 reports reveal that in the preceding two years, nine new cases
were submitted to the Court.78 The full Court, rather than the
Chamber, heard these nine cases, which except for one, 79 were all
filed by application.80 The nine new cases brought to the Court by
States included a variety of novel issues.81 The jurisdictional basis in
these cases varied from assertions of commitments made in the
course of mediation to straightforward reliance on the optional
clause. They also included a variety of treaty compromissory
clauses, including friendship, commerce and navigation treaties, and
the Chicago Convention.
Due to the increased activity of the World Court in 1991, there
was hope that the full Court, not the Chambers, would be busy developing new areas of international law. Commentators interpreted
this increased activity as an indication that the World Court would
primarily adjudicate matters relating to the law of the sea, and that
participation in the Court's process would increase.8 2 Moreover, the
increased activity in 1991 enabled the Court to serve as a forum for
the reconciliation of the disparate interests of developed and developing countries. In the near future the Court will likely become a
forum for a wide range of mid-level powers seeking to resolve important local problems probably concerning a boundary.8 3
78. See Peace Palace,supra note 10, at 647.
79. See id. at 647 n.10 (citing Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1990 I.C.J. 149 (Oct.
26) as an amalgam of application and special agreement).
80. See Peace Palace,supra note 10, at 647 (discussing that the same judges were repeatedly used for chamber assignments, which left other judges little to do, and whether such
chambers could maintain their quality as judicial institutions without inconsistencies rather
than becoming arbitration panels). See also Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Sal. v. Hond.), 1990 I.CJ. 3 (Feb. 28) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (denying the validity of
the chambers). See generally Andreas Zimmerman, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International
Courtof Justice, 8 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989) (discussing the use of Chambers).
81. See Peace Palace,supra note 10, at 647.
82. See id at 653. In 1991, two-thirds of the cases on the docket involved the law of the
sea directly. The Court is on a productive and convincing path toward mastery of the law of
the sea, and has produced the only single body of jurisprudence in the area from 1969 to
1991. See id. In 1991, Denmark, Bahrain, Chad, Finland and Qatar were new parties to the
Court. See id at 652.
83. See id at 654.
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2. 1992-1993
*As of October 15, 1993, the World Court had a full docket,
with eleven cases at various stages of resolution. 84 Recent additions
to the list include cases between Hungary and Slovakia over the
Danube dams.85 In addition, the list includes a request from the
World Health Organization for an advisory opinion-the only advisory opinion request on the docket-concerning the use of nuclear
86
weapons.
Twice during the 1992-1993 session, the Court dealt with complicated and lengthy requests for interim measures of protection in
the case brought by from Bosnia and Herzegovina against Yugosla87
via (Serbia and Montenegro) regarding the Genocide Convention.
Because these requests have priority over all other cases, the Court
88
immediately resolved these two interim requests.
On June 14, 1993, the Court entered final judgment in the case
between Denmark and Norway.8 9 This case concerned the maritime boundary between the east coast of Greenland and the Norwegian Island of Jan Mayen. 90 Both parties considered the Court's
judgment as a satisfactory final settlement of a long-term dispute. 91
During this session, both the Nauru v. Australia case 92 and the

Is this all that bad a result? Perhaps it is the correct one for the next decade. The
greater powers could not be expected to abide by decisions of the Court in every
instance; it is the lesser powers that by definition require the additional strength
and protection of the Court and it is by their participation and willingness to use
the Court that new ground is broken, and past prejudices and fears are set aside
and allayed.
lId
84. See Sir Robert Y. Jennings, Speech by Sir Robert Jennings, Presidentof the International Court of Justice, to the UN. General Assembly, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 421 (1994).
[hereinafter Speech by Sir Robert Jennings].
85. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slov.), 1993 I.C.J. 151 (Dec. 20).
86. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1993 I.CJ.
467 (Sept. 13).
87. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 8).
88. See 1992 Report, supra note 53, at 3.
89. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v.
Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14).
90. See id.
91. See Gary L. Scott et al., Recent Activity Before the Court of Justice: Trend or Cycle? 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 14 (1996); see also Maritime Delimitation in the Area
between Greenland and Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38.
92. See Speech by Sir Robert Jennings, supra note 84, at 421. (citing Certain Phosphate
Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992 I.C.J. 345, 346 (June 29)).
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Great Belt case between Finland and Denmark 93 settled out of
court. The successful settlement of these two cases indicates a new
role for the World Court. The Court's intervention made further
negotiations between the parties possible and resulted in the successful settlement of the dispute. "No longer is resort to the International Court of Justice seen, to use the traditional phrase, as a 'last
resort' when all negotiation has finally failed. Rather, it is sometimes now to be seen as a recourse that might usefully be employed
at an earlier stage of the dispute." 94
Finally, during this period of heightened activity, the Court also
established a Chamber for Environmental Matters, believing some
litigants might prefer a Chamber composed of judges who expressed
95
a special interest in that area.
3. 1993-1994
Similar to the previous two years, the Court accepted three new
cases in 1993.96 According to the Report of the General Assembly
on the Work of the Organization, the World Court heard a record
number of thirteen cases in the 1993-94 sessions. 97 The Court's
docket included twelve contentious cases and one advisory opinion.
The parties consisted of States "from nearly every region in the
world. Judgment was rendered in two cases, and an Order on requests for the indication of provisional measures was made in a third
case." 98
The twelve contentious cases were as follows: (1) Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988;99 (2) East Timor;100 (3) Maritime Delimitation
between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal;10 1 (4) Maritime Delimitation

93. Passage through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1992 I.CJ. 348 (Sept. 10).
94. See Speech by Sir Robert Jennings, supra note 84, at 422.
95. See id. at 423.
96. See Peter H.F. Bekker, Current Development 1993-1994 Judicial Activity of the
World Court, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 213 (1995) [hereinafter CurrentDevelopment].
97. Report of the Secretary - General on the work of the Organization, September 1994,
U.N. Doc. A/49/1 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Report].
98. Id. at 7.
99. Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Rep. of Iran v. U.S.), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
100. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 32 (May 19).
101. On March 12, 1991, the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau filed an
Application against the Republic of Senegal in a dispute concerning the delimitation of
maritime territories between the two States. Maritime Delimitation between GuineaBissau and Senegal (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 8).
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and TerritorialQuestions between Qatarand Bahrain;10 2 (5) Questions of Interpretationand Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v.
U.K.)10 3 and (Libya v. U.S.); 10 4 (6) Oil Platforms (Islamic Rep. of
Iran v. U.S.);105 (7) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v.
Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro));10 6 (8) Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary/Slovakia);l0 7 (9) Land and Maritime Boundary
(Cameroon v. Niger.); 0 8 (10) Libya/Chad;10 9 and (11) Nauru v.
Australia which settled in September, 1993.110
In September 1993, the World Health Organization also requested an advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons by a State in armed conflict."'
4. 1994-1996
During the 1995 calendar year, the Court had two new contentious cases and one new advisory opinion case. 112 The two new
cases were FisheriesJurisdictioncase, 113 brought on Application on
102. On July 8, 1991, the Government of the State of Qatar filed an Application
against the Government of the State of Bahrain concerning a dispute about the sovereignty of maritime boundaries between the two states. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bah.), 1994 I.C.J. 112 (July 1).
103. - Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1995 I.C.J. 282 (Sept. 22).
104. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1995 I.C.J. 285 (Sept. 22).
105. The United States filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the World
Court. In January 1994, the President of the Court set a time limit for the written statement by Iran on these objections. Oil Platforms (Islamic Rep. of Iran v. U.S.), 1993 I.C.J.
35 (June 3).
106. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13).
107. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1993 I.C.J. 319 (July 14).
108. Cameroon instituted proceedings against Nigeria in a dispute concerning questions of sovereignty over the peninsula of Bakassi on March 29, 1994. Land Maritime
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Niger.), 1996 I.C.J. 13 (Mar. 13).
109. The World Court decided the Libya/Chad case on February 3, 1994. The U.N.
Aouzou Strip Observer Group Council (UNASOG) will implement the decision. See
Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
110. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Sept. 13).
111. See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1993
I.C.J. 467 (Sept. 13).
112. See Peter H.F. Bekker, The 1995 JudicialActivity of the InternationalCourt of Jusace, 90 AM J. INT'L L. 328 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 JudicialActivity].
113. See id. (citing Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1996 I.CJ. 58 (May 8)).
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March 28, 1995, and the Nuclear Tests case. 114 In the Nuclear Tests
Case, the Court heard New Zealand's request for an examination of
the situation in light of the Court's December 20, 1994 judgment in
the Nuclear Tests case. 115 The U.N. General Assembly also requested an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons. 116 Thus, in 1995, a total of thirteen cases appeared
on the General List. 117 The majority of these cases, however, were
carried over from the previous session, except for the Nauru v. Australia case, 118 which was settled in September 1993 and the
Libya/Chadcase, 119 which was decided on February 3, 1994.120
In 1995, the World Court issued a total of ten orders. 121 These
orders involved fixing time limits for the advisory opinions of the
Nuclear Tests case, 22 the Qatar and Bahrain cases, 123 the Lockerbie
cases, 124 the Genocide case, 125 and the FisheriesJurisdictioncase. 126
The full Court held public sittings in four cases: East Timor,127 New
Zealand v. France,128 and the two nuclear weapons advisory opinions.129 On February 15, 1995, the Court delivered a judgment on

114. See id.
115. See Request for an Examination of the Situation in accordance with Paragraph 63 of
the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288
(Sept. 22).
116. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.CJ. (July 8).
117. See 1995 JudicialActivity, supra note 112, at 328.
118. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1993 I.C.J. 322 (Sept. 13).
119. Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3).
120. See 1995 JudicialActivity, supranote 112, at 329; see also infra note 142.
121. See id.
122. See id. (discussing Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, 1995 I.CJ. 3 (July 8) and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996
I.CJ. (July 8)).
123. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahr.), 1995 I.CJ. 6 (Feb. 15).
124. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie 282 (Libya v. U.K.), 1995 I.C.J. 282 (Sept. 9);
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1995 I.C.J. 285 (Sept. 9).
125. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. Herz. v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1995 I.C.J. 80 (July 14).
126. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1996 I.CJ. 58 (May 8)).
127. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.CJ. 90 (June 30).
128. See Peter H.F. Bekker, Recent Developments at the World Court; AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. NEWSL., Nov. 1995, at 1. On September 22, 1995, the Court issued an order to dismiss the
Request by New Zealand to reopen the nuclear test case, which claimed France's atmospheric tests caused deposits of radio active fall-out on New Zealand territory. See id
129. Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1995 I.C.J. 3
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jurisdiction and admissibility in the Qatar and Bahrain case. 130 On
June 30, 1995, the Court decided the East Timor case.' 3 ' However,
the Court held by a 14 to 2 majority that it could not adjudicate the
legal dispute between Portugal and Australia. 132 The Court also
held that East Timor must remain a self-governing territory and that
133
the people of East Timor have the right to self-determination.
On September 22, 1995, the Court dismissed New Zealand's request
to reopen the case against France. 34 On November 14, 1995, the
Court issued a fifth order discontinuing the case concerning maritime delimitation between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, which was
brought on March 12, 1991.135

In 1996, the Court continued its productive pace. 136 On February 12, 1996, Cameroon filed a Request for Provisional Measures-a
form of injunction-to stop the fighting between Cameroon and Nigerian forces. 137 On February 23, 1996, the Court dismissed the case
concerning the aerial incident between Iran and the United States
because both parties had entered into negotiations for a friendly
settlement of the matter on August 8, 1994.138 On July 8, 1996, the

Court ruled on the September 3, 1993 World Health Organization's
Request for an Advisory Opinion relating to the use of nuclear
weapons, and it also handed down its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons. 139 On May 29, 1996, Botswana and
Namibia jointly filed a case to determine the boundary between
Botswana and Namibia around Kasikili/Sedudu Island as well as to
determine the legal status of the island. 140 On December 12, 1996,
(July 6) and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. (July 8).
130. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahr.), 1995 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 15).
131. East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. 90.
132. See id.
133. See Peter H.F. Bekker, Recent Developments at the World Courn AM. SOC'Y. INT'L
L. NEWSL., Sept. 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Recent Developments].
134. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of
the Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J.
288, 307 (Sept. 22).
135. Maritime Delimitation between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (Guinea-Bissau v.
Sen.), 1995 I.C.J. 423 (Nov. 8). Agents of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal informed the President
of the International Court of Justice of their agreement to discontinue the proceedings
through letters dated November 2 and 6, 1995, respectively.
136. See Recent Developments, supra note 133.
137. See id
138. See id.
139. See 1995 Report,supra note 14, at 39-41.
140. See Recent Developments, supra note 133.
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the Court rejected the U.S. objection to the Court's jurisdiction in
the Oil Platforms case involving Iran and the United States. 141
Thus, the Court dealt with twelve contentious cases and two advisory opinions for the period between August 1, 1995 to July 31,
1996.142
5. 1997
In order to obtain evidence in the Hungary v. Slovakia dispute,
the Court issued an order on February 5, 1997 for World Court investigators to visit the site of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric dam project near Bratislava in the Slovak Republic. A Special Agreement between Hungary and the Slovak Republic on July
2, 1993 referred the dispute between the two countries to the
143
Court.

IV. WHY SELECT THE WORLD COURT?

A. Purposes of the World Court
In 1991, President George Bush announced the beginning of
the air strikes against Iraq. In his speech, he submitted to the
American people a plea for a new world order, saying, "[w]e have
before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the
law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations." 144 It is generally
accepted that peace under the rule of law is an ideal. 145 The World
Court provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes by intervening in, and enhancing the role of, international legal order. 146
"Now that the use of force is generally prohibited, the only
141. See 1995 Report, supra note 14, at 37.
142. The General List is published yearly in the Report of the InternationalCourt of Justice, e.g., August 1, 1995-July 31, 1996 is in the General Assembly official records. See id
This General List for the perior August 17, 1995-July 31, 1996 contains the same as those
which appeared on the list which appears above for the period 1993-1994, excluding the East
Timor case, the LibyalChadcase, and the Naura v. Australia case, and including the Fisheries
Jurisdiction case (Spain v. Canada), the New Zealand v. France case, the Kasili/Sedudu Island case (Botswana v. Namibia) and the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons requestedby the United Nations. See 1994 Repor4 supranote 97.
143. See Recent Developments Mar.-Apr. 1997,supra note 25, at 1.
144. Andrew Rosenthal, No GroundFighting Yet Call to Arms by Hussein, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1991, at A8.
145. See Joseph L. Daly, Is the InternationalCourt of Justice Worth the Effort 20 AKRON
L. REV. 391,403 (1987).
146. See id.
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way one can solve a dispute is by a decision of some impartial international body. Despite the doubts of some people, the Internaclosest thing we have to such an imtional Court of Justice is the
147
body.
partial international
B. Weaknesses of the World Court
Nations sometimes view the submission of a dispute to the
World Court as an "unfriendly" act.148 This attitude may account
for its under-utilization. The delays of the Court proceedings, due
opinions, have also disto a large number of separate and dissenting
149
Court.
the
using
from
couraged parties
Some nations object to the procedure by which the judges of
the Court are elected, claiming that the judges do not have uniformly high qualifications, impartiality, or independence. 150 In addition, reservations ratione temporis of the optional clause have
weakened the effectiveness of the Court, and it has been suggested
that the Court should adopt a resolution on the subject of these reservations. 151
Furthermore, the unpredictability of the Court's decisions due
in part to the application of uncodified customary international law
represents one of its most serious weaknesses. Agreement about the
content and process of international law is not shared by all nations. 152 Moreover, the new nations of the Third World, representing the majority of the world's people, contend that they are not
bound by customary norms and that U.N. resolutions instead should
create international legal norms.153 Thus, the substantive norm to
be applied by the Court is, itself, indeterminate. 154 In view of this
uncertainty and the contested principles of customary international
law, 155 some argue that the Court should reconsider application of
customary international law until it is properly codified. 156 In addition, uncertainty about the Court's application of the law contributes
147. Louis B. Sohn, Forum, American Acceptance of the Jurisdictionof the International
Courtof Justice: Experiencesand Prospects,19 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 489,489 (1989).
148. See Consideration,supranote 70, at 253.
149. See idi at 301.
150. See id at 308.
151. See id. at 315.
152. See Kelly, supranote 3, at 129.
153. See id.
154. See id
155. See id
156. See Consideration,supra note 70, at 317.
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to the fear of many governments that they will lose control if they
157
submit their cases to World Court jurisdiction.
Scholars espouse different views regarding the causes of the
World Court's weaknesses. Richard Falk argues convincingly that
the World Court's judicial style and narrow perspective have significantly impaired its functioning and have isolated it from the majority of nations. 158 Through a study of cases, Falk shows that the
Court's opinions contain a subtle, jurisprudential paradigm that is
positivist in legal style, Western in its use of sources, non-normative
and obtuse in character, as well as indeterminant. 159 The Court's
Western positivist judicial style makes it less-responsive to nonWestern cultures. The substance of the decisions grounded in Western hegemony creates an institution inhospitable to non-Western interests. Falk proposes that the Court utilize a normative pluralistic
jurisprudence that will consider panhumanistic commitments derived from principles set forth in the U.N. Charter and the diverse
cultural, ideological, and national perspectives throughout the
world. 160
In contrast, another scholar Michael Reisman, disagrees with
Falk's view that the weakness of the Court is its domination by
Western ideology and its bias in favor of the United States. Reisman argues that the changing composition of the Court has led to a
bias against the United States. 161 He believes that this bias caused
the United States to withdraw its optional clause declaration and to
refuse to appear in the Nicaraguacase.1 62
Professor Patrick Kelly argues that Falk's proposal for a normative pluralistic jurisprudence will cause the disintegration of the
Court and of international law. 163 In addition, Professor Kelly argues that "the frequent use of special chambers procedures, voluntar[il]y or not, in contested substantive areas," would lead to a pluralistic and fragmented jurisprudence. 164
He recommends a
157. See itd
158. See FALK, supra note 7, at 178-80.
159. See id at 179-80.
160. See id.at 190-91.
161. See W. Michael Reisman, Termination of the United States DeclarationUnder Article 36(2) of the Statute of the International Court, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE
COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Aug. 1985, at
73.
162. See i. at 74-75.
163. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 159.
164. Id. at 164.
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"universal jurisprudence agreed upon by all nations."'1 65
The United States pioneered international adjudication when it
signed the Jay Treaty with the United Kingdom in 1794, establishing
several arbitral tribunals. 166 The United States has more recently
shown ambivalence toward the World Court. 1 67 Thomas Franck
and Jerome Lehrman 168 persuasively argue that United States policy has veered between "messianism," fired by a utopian belief that
the United States could lead states into accepting the world rule of
law, and "chauvinism," reflecting the United States' "real-politik"
counter-tendency and its distrustful view of other States and of international involvement in general. 169 The messianic vision, which
states that law rather than war should settle disputes, appeared to
triumph with the passage of the optional clause declaration. The
chauvinistic tradition of untrammeled sovereignty found expression
in the Connally Reservation, which erases the commitment of the
United States to compulsory jurisdiction. 170 Franck and Jerome argue that, to achieve the messianic vision, proponents must find appropriate substantive areas for international adjudication and must
design tribunals whose judges will be receptive to United States' interests. 171
Until recently, an applicant State would select the World Court
to adjudicate its dispute only if it believed that it would win. Or, if
the applicant State wanted to make a statement or teach a lesson
without using force, it also might bring its dispute before the World
Court. Furthermore, a State could only rightfully bring the dispute
before the World Court if the dispute did not involve national life or
domestic issues. Until recently a State generally appealed to the
World Court to settle or solve the dispute only if it were absolutely
desperate. 172

165. Id at 164.
166. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1974, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 116
[hereinafter Treaty of Amity].
167. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 129.
168. Thomas M. Franck & Jerome M. Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace Through Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A
CROSSROADS 3 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987).
169. See Richard B. Bilder, The United States and the World Court in the Post "Cold
War" Era,40 CATH. U.L. REV. 251,253 (1991).
170. Kelly, supra note 3, at 135.
171. See Franck, supra note 168, at 18.
172. See SINGH, supra note 18, at 225 (discussing the reasons why States use the International Court of Justice).
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Sir Robert Jennings believes that this cold climate surrounding
the World Court has changed and that "there can be only one
'principal judicial organ of the United Nations,' as there is normally
only one supreme court of any legally ordered community; and that
position of the International Court of Justice ought always to be remembered and strenuously protected."'1 73 Sir Robert Jennings defends the Court's delays by stating, "one is justified in saying that the
Court itself really works remarkably quickly, and the time taken will
be found in any event.., to compare favourably with other superior
courts of both domestic and international jurisdiction."'1 74
One of the reasons the World Court has not expanded its adjudicative role is the requirement that its subject-matter jurisdiction
be limited to legal and not political issues. Scholars have suggested
that the increased activity of the World Court in recent years may be
due partly to a more realistic appreciation of an international court
of justice's place in a global society governed by international law.
Rather than thinking of the Court as a forum for the settlement of
all international disputes, it is more realistic to accept that some disputes require political decisions by a political body.
Such a body will of course work within the framework of the
law, but the reasons for the decision will be political rather than
legal ....People are much more likely to resort to the Court if
they have a clear idea of what it can and should do, and what it
cannot do. 175
The questionable qualifications and lack of impartiality of the
Judges weakens the Court. To overcome this criticism, the Court
has recently employed the panel approach to adjudication, in which
only five out of the fifteen judges hear a case. 176 However, this
chamber procedure has itself been criticized. "If States choose only
to use such specially selected panels, the World Court could become
a series of ad hoc arbitral tribunals sitting at a common seat, rather
than remaining a 'World Court.' ' 177 Moreover, the use of panels
may erode the concept of the World Court as a global institution for
the preservation of peace and may foster the idea that the judges of
173. See Speech by Sir RobertJennings, supra note 84, at 424.
174. Id at 423. It should also be noted that the Court's standing Chamber of Summary
Procedure has never been employed, although it is available for expedited cases. See Id
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 246,247 (Oct. 12).
177. See Bilder, supra note 169, at 256-57.
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the Court are biased.
During a Jurisprudential Lecture at the University of Washington, Honorable Stephen Schwebel, then a judge of the International
Court of Justice, commented that the refusal of certain defendant
States to appear in Court, even where the Court clearly or arguably
178
had jurisdiction, cripples the Court.
Finally, the lack of compliance with the Court's final judgments
undermines the World Court's strength. 179 The current structure of
international adjudication reinforces the failure of States to comply
180
with the Court's judgments.
The Court's recent heightened activity has placed it under exceptional strain and has subjected staff and resources to severe cuts.
Despite budgetary restrictions, for example, the Court has been deliberating on three cases simultaneously, instead of taking one case
at a time.181
C. Strengths of the World Court
Peace under law is an ideal; 182 the World Court was established
to address the universal need for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The World Court provides a State the opportunity
to resolve an international dispute if it has a legal interest. 183 The
very existence and active use of the Court enhance international legal order. The Court plays the role of a teacher, an advisor, a source
of developing international law, and the hope of a world built on law
and justice. The World Court also offers opportunities to depoliticize decisions by allowing a losing party to simply blame the Court
for the judgments.
The development of the Chambers of the Court confers the advantages of both arbitration and adjudication. 184 The Chamber System provides an accepted body of procedural rules and the facilities
178. See Stephen M. Schwebel, Reflections on the Role of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1061, 1067 (1986).
179. See id
180. See id
181. See 1995 Report, supranote 14, at 5.
182. See Daly, supra note 145, at 403 (listing the strengths and weaknesses of the World
Court).
183. See U.N. CHARTER art. 62; see also Taslim 0. Elias, The Limits of the Right of Intervention in a Case before the International Court of Justice, in VOLKERRECHT ALS
RECHTSORDNUNG INTERNATIONALE GERICHTS BARKEIT MENSCHENRECHTE, (1983);

INTERVENTION, supra note 63, at 46.
184. See Schwebel, supra note 178, at 1070.
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of the Court in the Hague. Moreover, proceedings before a chamber are less expensive for the parties than those which require finding and the establishment of an arbitral tribunals.
V. THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE WORLD COURT

The Court's future role may be limited by a number of factors.
First, other types of dispute resolution such as negotiation, mediation, and conciliation exist. Second, as set forth in U.N. Charter Article 33, the United Nations and other regional agencies may settle
international disputes. 185 According to the U.N. Charter, States
may use other international tribunals to resolve disputes. 186 As a result, many cases are currently decided in other international arenas,
in bilateral arbitrations, in the dispute resolution mechanisms of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization, and in the panels of the North American Free Trade
Agreement. Furthermore, World Court adjudication can be risky,
costly, unpredictable, not always impartial, and sometimes unenforceable. The risk of entrusting national interests to foreign judges
who may be biased is overwhelming for some States, causing those
States to choose other dispute resolution mechanisms.
Despite these issues, the World Court should play a greater role
in the future because adjudication as a means of dispute resolution is
dispositive and final. The Court is usually principled, impartial and
orderly. It can provide time for parties that are in a protracted dispute to reach an agreement that is mutually beneficial. It settles
disputes and provides advisory opinions, and as an impartial tribunal, it can "depoliticize" a dispute and reinforce the rule of law.
The World Court may be especially helpful in certain types of
disputes in which governments are not particularly concerned about
the outcome but are, nevertheless, unable to compromise the issue
in negotiations. 187 The Court has proven to be an ideal forum for
the reconciliation of serious, local problems like boundary disputes. 188 Furthermore, if a dispute involves difficult factual or
technical issues, the Court can provide impartial assistance.
The World Court should also play a greater role in the future
because of the increasing demand for the resolution of environ185. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33.
186. See U.N. CHARTER art. 95.
187. See Bilder, supra note 169, at 259.
188. See Peace Palace,supra note 10, at 654; see also supra text accompanying note 83.
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mental disputes. It is in a unique position to settle such disputes because it has created a special chamber to deal with each environmental dispute brought to it. 189
For new States with middle-level power, the Court is the forum
to resolve serious local problems. The Court could become the forum for the reconciliation of the interests of developing countries
with those of the super powers. With the rise of developing countries after World War II, the world has seen the emergence of a
large group of prominent non-Western jurists in the World Court.190
Of the fifteen judges ruling in 1988, almost half were from developing countries including Senegal, Guyana, and Nigeria. 191 This development should aid in re-establishing a more accurate balance of
power in the Court and allowing the Court to better reflect the
change in political climate and patterns of international relations.
However, in January 1996, there was only one inter-African case
192
pending between Cameroon and Nigeria.
One way to improve and enhance the use of the World Court in
the future is to expand its advisory jurisdiction. Professor Louis
Sohn has suggested possibilities for such an expansion. 193 For example, the General Assembly should authorize other general or regional public international organizations to request advisory opinions. 194 Furthermore, the court should allow two or more States to
submit a dispute for advisory opinion.
Leo Gross, another scholar, has offered a practical suggestion
for the expansion of the Court's role in the future. 195 In view of the
development of European Union law and the successful role that
the European Court of Justice has played in Western Europe
through the extensive use of referral of cases from national courts to
the European Court of Justice, a viable option is the use of a similar
referral system for the World Court. 196 National courts of the
189. See Barbara Kelly, The InternationalCourt of Justice:Its Role in a New World Legal
Order,3 TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223 (1992) [hereinafter New World Order].
190. See Anthony Clark Arend, The InternationalCourt of Justice, InternationalLaw, and
United States Foreign Policy, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMPULSORY JURIS-

(1986).
191. See New World Order,supra note 189, at 243.
192 See Recent Developments, supra note 133.
193. See Louis B. Sohn, Broadeningthe Advisory Jurisdictionof the InternationalCourt of
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Justice, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 124 (1983).
194. See id at 125.

195. See generally Consideration,supra note 70.
196. See id.
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European Union often refer cases to the European Court of Justice
pursuant to an Article 177 proceeding1 97 concerning questions that
198
arise about the interpretation or validity of European Union law.
Similarly, national tribunals could refer a complex international law
question to the World Court.199
VI. CONCLUSION

The World Court is expanding its efforts to maintain world
peace and to adjudicate international disputes. New States of middle-level power have begun submitting cases to the World Court.
The Court is performing new functions as an advisor, a settler of
disputes, and a conciliator of the interests of developing nations with
those of the super powers. The demise of Communism, resulting in
a sudden and marked increase in the use of the Court, undermines
the arguments regarding the Court's weaknesses and emphasizes the
inextricable link between law and politics.

197. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 76.
198. See Consideration,supra note 70, at 309.
199. See id. at 312.

